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In Information and Computer Ethics (ICE), and, in fact, in normative and evaluative research of Information Technology (IT) in general, analyses of the prudential values of IT are often neglected by the researchers. Yet, these analyses contain important insights for answering normative questions on people’s well-being. In this paper, I urge researchers in ICE to take these analyses of IT seriously. A serious study of these analyses will broaden the scope of ICE. But, what are these analyses? I will distinguish the analyses of the prudential values of IT from other types of normative and evaluative analysis of IT by noting their unique guiding ideal, i.e. the Well-being. Then, I will explain why these analyses are not taken seriously by researchers in ICE, and argue why they should not be neglected. After that, I will outline a framework to analyse and evaluate these analyses, and I will apply the framework to analyse and evaluate an actual prudential analysis, i.e. Nicholas Carr’s “Is Google Making Us Stupid”. Finally, I will briefly conclude this paper by outlining the limits of the framework proposed in this paper, and then to identify the further research that need to be done.
 
1. Introduction
In “Is Google Making Us Stupid?”, an article published in The Atlantic, Nicholas Carr (2008) described the possible impact of Information Technology (IT) on a people’s cognition. He argued that the Internet has altered the way people read and think, which makes a specific way of reading and thinking, i.e. deep reading and deep thinking, difficult. The aim of Carr’s article, therefore, is to highlight what he believed to be one of the detrimental effects of the Internet on one’s quality of life. It should be clear that the aim of Carr’s article is normative, as he explicitly argued against a specific form of online practice. If one understands morality in the broad sense, which encompasses the questions about how one should live, then Carr’s argument should also be included in the domain of morality. While Carr’s article has generated heated debates on the Internet, researchers in Information and Computer Ethics (ICE) have not responded as enthusiastically. In fact, Carr’s article is only one of the more visible examples among various appraisals of IT.​[1]​ As the amount of these appraisals of IT continues to grow, I think, more attention should be given to them. The insufficient attention to these appraisals seems to reiterate Charles Taylor’s characterisation of contemporary moral philosophy, which he claimed “tended to focus on what is right to do rather than on what is good to be, on defining the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life” (Taylor 1989, 3), and as a result, the domain of morality in contemporary moral philosophy becomes “cramped and truncated” (ibid.). By turning the focus to these appraisals, which discuss the possible impact of IT on people’s quality of life, it will enrich the discussions in ICE and alleviate the worry expressed by Taylor.

Hence, the aim of this paper is to urge researchers in ICE to take these appraisals seriously. A serious study of these appraisals will broaden the scope of ICE. Yet, what are these appraisals? I will first answer this question in the next part of the paper. Following Brey (2007), I distinguish Carr’s and similar appraisals from other types of normative analysis of IT. And then, I will explain why these appraisals are not taken seriously by researchers in ICE, and argue why they should not be ignored. After that, I will outline a framework for analysing and evaluating these appraisals, and then apply the framework to analyse Carr’s article. Finally, I will conclude this paper by outlining the limits of the framework proposed in this paper and identifying the further research that needed to be done.

2. Prudential Analysis of Information Technology
In the Introduction, I have pointed out that the aim of Carr’s and other appraisals similar to it are normative. Yet, an important question remains, that is – what distinguish these appraisals from other normative analysis of IT? According to Brey (2007), the current normative and evaluative research of IT can generally be divided into four traditions, namely ethical analysis, normative political analysis, aesthetic analysis and epistemological analysis. Brey's division is based on the observation that these analyses are guided by different ideals. For example, ethical analyses of IT are generally grounded in ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism and virtue-based theories, and IT-related ethical issues, e.g. issues on privacy and anonymity, intellectual property, etc. are scrutinised using these ethical theories.​[2]​ In other words, the guiding ideal for ethical analyses of IT is the Right. Similarly, for their specific domain of inquiry, the guiding ideals for normative political analyses, aesthetic analyses and epistemological analyses are the Just, the Beauty and the True respectively. (Brey 2007) However, as he rightly pointed out, such a division does not exhaust all forms of normative and evaluative research that are currently undertaken. Particularly, he has identified what he labelled ‘cultural critique’ as a specific form of normative and evaluative analysis of IT that is distinct from those mentioned in the division. According to Brey (2007), cultural critiques direct to the culture itself. And, in the current context, cultural critiques of IT take cultural issues generated by the developments and uses of IT as their object of inquiry. Yet, what precisely distinguished cultural critiques from other types of normative and evaluative analyses of IT is not merely its object of inquiry, but rather it is the different guiding ideal. Cultural critiques are different from other types of normative and evaluative analysis, precisely because they are “governed by our most general ideal, which is the Good.” (Brey 2007, 4)

While Brey’s notion of cultural critique provides an important alternative to classify a family of normative and evaluative analysis of IT that does not readily fit into the four traditions, the guiding ideal of cultural critique, i.e. the Good, nonetheless appears to be too general and too abstract to capture what is unique to the appraisals such as Carr’s. Those appraisals, undoubtedly, are about IT-related cultural issues, but it is not immediately clear that they are about what is the Good of IT per se. The central question of those appraisals, as it appears, is mostly limited to what the current, as well as possible, effects of IT can have on people. Particularly, they concern with whether, and to what extent, IT is good for (or bad for) people. In other words, these appraisals are about the prudential values (or disvalues) of IT. Here, following Griffin (1996), the term ‘prudential values’ refers to “everything that makes a life good simply for the person living it.” (Griffin 1996, 19) For example, in his article, Carr attempted to argue that the Internet has diminished people’s ability to concentrate. He argued that the Web, which contains numerous hyperlinks within the pages, has changed people’s habit of reading (and thinking). He lamented people’s disability to focus on reading longer texts, e.g. literary classics, and argued that such a change is a loss for people. As such, the conclusion he drew from his observation is that the Internet is bad for people. In short, Carr’s and similar appraisals aim to analyse the prudential values (or disvalues) of IT, and it should be clear by now that the guiding ideal of these appraisal is the Well-being of the people. Since these appraisals are governed by a specific ideal, i.e. the Well-being, and they proceed by analysing the prudential values of IT. Given their unique guiding ideal, these appraisals should be placed into a separate category. Since they focus on the prudential values of IT, I shall call them prudential analysis of IT.

So far, I have placed the appraisals of IT similar to Carr’s into a separate category, i.e. prudential analysis of IT, and pointed out that these analyses are primarily about IT’s impacts on people’s well-being. Theoretically, therefore, these analyses have to be backed by a specific view of well-being. Hence, before moving further, it is necessary first to provide a brief summary of the major views of well-being that are currently available. For the purpose of the current paper, I shall restrict my scope to the philosophical theories of well-being.​[3]​ Yet, it should be noted that philosophical theories of well-being can be merely descriptive. The task for a descriptive theory of well-being is to provide an analysis of the concept of well-being; but, a theory of well-being as such is not by itself normative. A theory of well-being can be seen as normative, when it also tackles the question: how should I live? Since the prudential analysis of IT is a normative inquiry, it requires, at its foundation, a normative theory of well-being. So, in the remaining of this section, I will concentrate on the normative theories of well-being and ignore the descriptive and normative distinction. 

In philosophy, theories of well-being generally fall into one of the following types, namely hedonism, desire theories and objective list theories.​[4]​ Hedonism, in its simplest formulation, maintains that the greater the pleasure and the fewer the pain a person has, the better will be the person’s life. A person’s well-being, according to hedonism, lies in the individual’s maximisation of pleasure and minimisation of pain. While hedonism equates a person’s well-being with her acquisition of pleasure and avoidance of pain, a naïve desire theory argues that one’s well-being consists of the fulfilment of the person’s desire. In other words, a person’s life is at its best if she can satisfy all desires that she has. Finally, objective list theories maintain that one’s well-being is determined by a list of goods that may be independent to any individual’s acquisition of pleasure or fulfilment of desires. An objective list theory is objective, precisely because of the list of goods specified by the theory is supposed to be required by every person’s well-being regardless of who he or she is. Typically, goods such as knowledge, friendship and other virtuous characters are proposed to be included in the list. Accordingly, a person’s life is good when she obtains the goods that are included in the list.

The brief summary provided above is admittedly brief. Numerous objections against hedonism, desire theories and objective list theories are proposed, and it remains a heated debate as to which theory best characterises the concept of well-being. Sophisticated versions of hedonism, desire theories and objective list theories are developed and defended by philosophers to answer the objections against their own theory. Yet, although the philosophical debate on the true theory of well-being is an interesting and important topic, it is not the place to discuss these complications in this section. The point of outlining these philosophical theories of well-being is simply to illustrate the relation between prudential analyses of IT and theories of well-being. As I have noted, prudential analyses of IT, being normative in nature, require a normative theory of well-being as their basis. Therefore, the conclusion one draws from her prudential analysis of IT is essentially effected by which theory of well-being she subscribes. So, if a person maintains a naïve desire theory to be the true theory of well-being, barring various complications, she will conclude that IT, or a specific IT-related practice, is good for the people as long as it helps individuals to satisfy their desires. The conclusion will obviously be different, if she holds a different theory of well-being, e.g. objective list theory, which requires something other than the fulfilment of desires to be conducive to the people’s well-being.

3. Why Prudential Analysis is Neglected and Why It Should Not Be
Having distinguished prudential analyses of IT from other types of normative and evaluative analysis of IT and explained their relation to philosophical theories of well-being; in this section, I will offer two reasons of why prudential analyses of IT are being neglected by researchers in ICE. The first reason is based on a more casual observation of the style of writing of these analyses, and it is linked to the way in which the appraisals such as Carr’s are actually presented. And, the second reason is derived from the theoretical nature of the theories of well-being itself. Yet, I will show none of these reasons warrant the negligence of prudential analyses of IT. Indeed, I will argue that prudential analyses are a necessary complement to the theories of well-being if one is to provide an answer to the normative question: how should one live? Particularly, if one wants to provide an answer to this question with respect to the impacts of IT, one has to go beyond the philosophical theories of well-being and consider the concrete insights provided by prudential analyses of IT.

A casual observation of the venues where the prudential analyses, which take the form of an appraisal such as Carr’s, are published may provide the hint of why they are not taken seriously by researchers in ICE. These appraisals are generally found in popular journals (and, the subsequent discussions of those appraisals usually take place on blogs). The intended readership of these appraisals, therefore, is understandably different from those of academic journals or books. As these appraisals are written for the general public, they demand a different style of writing; unlike academic (or philosophical) scholarships, which emphasise the structure and explicitness of arguments, these appraisals express their claims by extensive use of concrete examples, stories or anecdotes. Also, they seldom examine the theoretical and/or empirical supports for their claims. Theories or empirical evidence, if the appraisals contain any of them at all, are often mentioned only in passing. While the structure and explicitness of arguments and the theoretical and/or empirical supports for one’s conclusion are essential to academic research, they may be considered as excessive information for an article intended for the general public. 

The style of writing as such, I believe, leads to the impression that these appraisals do not constitute serious scholarships that are worthy of scrutiny. And, the impression of the semi-seriousness of these appraisals is boosted by the metaphorical and oft-hyperbolic expressions in the appraisals. The title of Carr’s article, i.e. “Is Google Making Us Stupid”, is one of the examples. Others, such as the title (and subtitle) of the books by Andrew Keen (2007) and Mark Bauerlein (2008), namely The Cult of the Amateur: How blogs, MySpace, YouTube, and the rest of today's user-generated media are destroying our economy, our culture, and our values and The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future (Or, Don't Trust Anyone Under 30), provide vivid examples of the metaphorical and hyperbolic language being used in the appraisals. As a result, I think, it is inevitable that these appraisals invite suspicion to the seriousness and worthiness of them.

The impression of unimportant and unworthy for serious scholarships generated by the style of writing of these appraisals, however, is unfortunate. For, although these appraisals may lack in their arguments the structure, explicitness and/or adequate supports, they nevertheless provide important insights for answering the question: how one should live (with respect to the developments and uses of IT). Particularly, these appraisals provide actual cases for researchers to reflect on the impacts of IT on a person’s quality of life. A serious investigation of these appraisals, therefore, will enable us to better understand how people believe IT, in reality, may affect a person’s quality of life.

While the reason I have offered above is based on a stipulation of the researchers’ attitude and reaction towards the appraisals, I want to provide a more substantial reason that is derived from the theoretical nature of philosophical theories of well-being itself. There is, I believe, a natural tendency for these theories to ignore prudential analyses. Let us recall the distinction between descriptive and normative theories of well-being in the previous section. As I have noted, a descriptive theory of well-being aims to provide a conceptual analysis for the concept of well-being, and a normative theory of well-being, which seeks to answer the question “how should one live?”, needs to know what constitutes a person’s well-being before it can provide any answer to that question. In this sense, the descriptive project is prior to the normative project. A careful reflection on the nature of the descriptive theories, however, will reveal that they are not immediately compatible with prudential analyses.

The task of descriptive project, as Tiberius (2004) pointed out, is “to give an analysis of the nature of well-being [by] articulat[ing] the criterion (or criteria) that any thing must meet in order to count as a source or cause of wellbeing.” (Tiberius 2004, 295-296) In other words, the project strives to define a universalistic concept of well-being. For example, hedonism defines ‘well-being’ as the acquisition of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Such a definition, however, is presumed by its defenders to be applicable to everyone across various cultural, social, historical and personal circumstances. The same is true for desire theories, which hold that the fulfilment of desires is conducive to one’s well-being to be an invariable fact. Finally, objective list theories, while being more substantive in their analyses of ‘well-being’, they still aim to specify the list of goods that are necessary (and sufficient) for any person’s well-being. The tendency to conceive ‘well-being’ as a universalistic concept, I think, has led researchers to formulate well-being in minimalistic terms and to construct their theories in the most context-free manner. Disconnecting the cultural, social, historical and personal circumstances, the resulting analysis from these theories of well-being is bounded to be abstract and theoretical. And, if a normative theory of well-being is built on its descriptive counterpart, then it is going to share the universalistic tendency inherited in the descriptive project.

On one hand, philosophical theories of well-being strive to provide an analysis that is clear of particulars, i.e. they strive to provide a concept of well-being that is applicable regardless of any circumstance. On the other hand, prudential analyses of IT mostly restrict themselves to actual cases of IT-related issues and are limited to specific values (or the activities that are believed to be valuable). For example, the impacts of the Internet on a person’s reading and thinking habits (Carr 2008), the proliferation of ‘amateur content’ on blogs, YouTube, etc. (Keen 2007), and the supposed harmful effects of IT to youth (Bauerlein 2008). Given the different nature of philosophical theories of well-being and prudential analyses, the apparent tension between the universality of the former and the particularity of the latter is obvious. As philosophical theories deploy a universalistic concept of well-being, it seems that they are warranted to ignore prudential analyses, which emphasise particularity and, thereby, appear to be irrelevant to the philosophical project.

However, it should be reminded that normative theories of well-being also attempt to answer the question “how should one live?” In the current context, the principal question for a normative theory of well-being, therefore, concerns with a person’s quality of life provided that she has and uses, or does not have and/or use, a specific IT. Here, normative theories of well-being, as I have characterised above, do not seem to provide adequate answers to such a question because they are devoid of circumstantial considerations that are important for issuing practical advices. The problem of normative theories of well-being as such is best captured by Williams’s (2005) objection to contemporary moral theory, as he pointed out “it is too abstract and theoretical to provide any substance to ethical life…, and it is precisely the use of “thick” ethical concepts, among other things, that contributes to a more substantive type of personal ethical experience than theory is likely to produce.” (2005, 48) The stronger claim from Williams is that moral theories, which try to analyse ethical concepts by using the most general terms, are bounded to fail. But I think it is not necessary to follow Williams and declare the whole enterprise of descriptive and normative theories of well-being as a failure. A more moderate lesson can be drawn from Williams’s objection. If a theory of well-being seeks to provide an answer to the question “how should one live?”, it has to go beyond the minimalistic concept of well-being and to include other factors such as cultural, social, historical and personal circumstances into its consideration. In this way, prudential analyses of IT, which situated themselves in a particular situation, provide an important complement to theories of well-being in answering IT-related normative questions.

Now, I shall illustrate, in more detail, the role prudential analyses of IT can play in complementing philosophical theories of well-being. Instead of showing what role they play in hedonism, desire theories and objective list theories separately, I will classify those theories into two types, i.e. objective theories and subjective theories, and explain the role prudential analyses will play in them. The distinction between objective and subjective theories is summarised by Sumner (1995) as the following: objective theories of well-being state that there is a list of objective goods for people’s well-being regardless of whether a person approves it or not, and subjective theories state that a person’s well-being ought to be determined by the person herself. Accordingly, objective list theories are clear instances of objective theories, and hedonism and desire theories are to be placed at the side of subjective theories.

It is, I think, relatively easy to discern the role prudential analysis of IT can play in objective theories of well-being. As the characterisation of objective theories suggests, there is a specific list of the goods regardless of any individual’s pro-attitudes towards them. In other words, a true objective theory implies the existence of objective goods that are independent of the people. Still, without taking people’s circumstances into account, the list of goods specified by an objective theory of well-being is likely to remain abstract and theoretical. Here, prudential analyses of IT can supply the objective theory with IT-related values that are specific to certain social, cultural, historical and/or personal circumstances. In turn, they can consolidate the objective theory by offering the supports that are essentially connected to actual cases. There is, therefore, a mutual relation between objective theories and prudential analyses of IT. A true objective theory will provide the normative foundation for prudential analyses, and prudential analyses will specify the values that are connected to a particular situation and help providing practical advices based on the more substantial values. The task of an objective theory, in this case, is to elaborate the conceptual relations between the abstract, theoretical values and the more substantial ones. Here, a true objective theory of well-being will also enable us to verify the truth or falsity of prudential analyses. Where the substantial values presupposed by a prudential analysis cannot be derived from the list of goods specified in the objective theory, it is reasonable to conclude that such an analysis is based on a false foundation.

For subjective theories of well-being, however, it may not be immediately clear why prudential analyses of IT do matter at all. For instance, prudential analyses aim to illustrate what good IT is for a person; the good for here, however, according to a subjective theory of well-being, is a subjective matter. So construed, a person’s prudential analysis of IT may be completely irrelevant to another person, because what is good for the first person may not be the same as the second one, that is – something is good for a person if and only if she determines that it is so, and in any case, she can decide that something is not good for her. In this sense, a prudential analysis may be reduced to an idiosyncratic opinion of what good IT is for the person who performs such an analysis. Of course, it is possible to criticise the above characterisation of prudential analysis by evoking notion such as a false picture of person. Those who argue with such a notion will point out that a person’s decision cannot be entirely separated from the community, thus, she will inevitably be influenced by the community’s evaluative standard. As a result, what good IT is for a person as specified in a prudential analysis of IT cannot just be an idiosyncratic opinion in the radical sense. I think this objection to such a characterisation of prudential analysis of IT is a plausible one, but I will not explore this option further. Instead, I will argue that, even if prudential analyses are akin to subjective opinions, a careful investigation of them can still enrich subjective theories of well-being.

Before proceeding to my claim, however, it is necessary to point out that the simplistic formulations of both hedonism and desire theories provided above are untenable. For example, one of the most prominent arguments against naïve hedonism is the argument from false pleasure. There are various formulations of the argument, but what is in common in them is the basic assumption that a person can be deceived into thinking her life to be pleasurable; but, since false pleasure is not conducive to one’s well-being, without the ability to distinguish false pleasure from the authentic one, simplistic hedonism is an untenable account of well-being.​[5]​ Similarly, naïve desire theories have been accused of not being able to separate false desires, i.e. desires induced by external factors that are against or ignoring the person’s own will, from the authentic ones. 

In response to the objections, more plausible formulations of both hedonism and desire theory are developed and defended by philosophers. For example, Feldman (2004) has proposed a version of hedonism, which only takes a specific form of pleasure, i.e. truth-adjusted (attitudinal) pleasure, to be conducive to a person’s well being. In Feldman’s theory, attitudinal pleasure is one that corresponds to the states of affairs, and only the pleasure derived from true states of affairs will be conducive to a person’s well being. Similarly, Griffin (1986) has argued for what he called informed desire theory, in which only the fulfilment of one’s rational and informed desires will contribute to her well-being. What distinguishes the simplistic hedonism and naïve desire theories from the more sophisticated formulations from Feldman and Griffin, as we can see, is the additional requirement on the type of pleasure and desires a person has in order for them to be conducive to her well-being. Despite the differences between Feldman’s and Griffin’s theory, the additional requirement seems to be the same for them, that is – both re-formulations have stressed the importance of the person’s rational scrutiny (of the pleasure or desires). I shall call this additional requirement ‘rational requirement’.

The rational requirement in subjective theories of well-being requires a person to determine her own criterion (or criteria) for well-being rationally. However, even if a subjective theory is true, it does not by itself provide the resources to facilitate the person’s rational thinking. The additional requirement in Feldman’s and Griffin’s sophisticated formulations is only a formal condition on the type of pleasure or desires a person should acquire or satisfy, but they provide no way, either in theory or in practice, to identify the appropriate type of pleasure or desires. Missing the resources, a subjective theory of well-being cannot provide any practical advice to the people. Here, prudential analyses can complement a true subjective theory of well-being with the information needed to discern the appropriateness of pleasure or desires, even if they merely appear as a form of subjective opinion. In other words, prudential analyses are a necessary complement to subjective theories of well-being if the latter are to provide practical advice to the people. Prudential analyses supply information from actual cases to individuals for them to better defend their own view of well-being. In short, prudential analyses provide the required information (or justifications) to rationally determine their own view.

4. Three Dimensions of Prudential Analysis
I have argued, in the previous section, that for both objective and subjective theories of well-being, if they attempt to answer the normative question about the people’s well-being, they need to pay more attention to prudential analyses of IT. However, as I have also noted, with the style of writing that is intended for the general public, the insights in the appraisals such as Carr’s are not readily transferrable to the academic (or philosophical) literature. Hence, to be able to utilise these appraisals, a better framework has to be developed for the analysis and evaluation of these appraisals.

Brey (2006) has developed a useful framework for analysing and evaluating the beliefs about Internet’s benefits and harms. Since his framework can readily be extended to analyse and evaluate of prudential analyses of IT, I shall provide a brief overview of it. Brey has distinguished two types of analysis and evaluation in his framework, i.e. descriptive analysis and critical analysis. In the descriptive analysis, the goal is to better understand an appraisal by clarifying the meanings of concepts in the appraisals, identifying the presupposed values and implied empirical claims and examining the evidence for the implied empirical claims.  And, in the critical analysis, one begins to critically scrutinise the appropriateness of the meanings of concepts as well as the legitimacy of the presupposed values in the appraisals. (2006, 7-8) Accordingly, it is possible to differentiate three dimensions in a prudential analysis of IT, they are the empirical dimension, the conceptual dimension and the evaluative dimension respectively.

The empirical dimension of an appraisal refers to those statements that are about the (possible) consequences of the developments and uses of IT, e.g. Carr’s claim that the Internet has altered the people’s reading and thinking habits. To analyse and evaluate the empirical dimension, one has to examine the purported facts suggested by the appraisal and verify its truth or falsity. Thus, the empirical dimension can only be studied by looking at the actual cases themselves. The conceptual dimension, on the other hand, is about the concepts deployed in the appraisal, and especially relevant to prudential analyses of IT is the nature of IT in question. The IT in question can be seen as value-laden or value-free, and/or it can be seen as deterministic, etc. Hence, the conceptual dimension of an appraisal has to be investigated against a background of philosophical theory of technology.

Finally, and perhaps, the most important for the current paper, is the evaluative dimension of an appraisal. The evaluative dimension specifies what good (or bad) IT is for people’s well-being and why. As I have shown, the judgments on what good (or bad) something is for a person’s well-being depend on the theory of well-being a person maintains. Moreover, I have also pointed out that, in prudential analyses of IT, the values go well beyond the abstract and theoretical ones, because prudential analyses are essentially about actual cases. Hence, to analyse and evaluate the evaluative dimension, it is necessary to identify the substantial values specific to those cases. But, what are those values? As Brey (2006) rightly pointed out, the values presupposed by people’s evaluative claims are often shared by a large group of people. Following Rawls, he called systems of values shared by the people comprehensive doctrines, i.e. “systems of value, be they religious, moral or ideological, that contain values concerning what is good and bad, and are often accompanied by norms for conduct and a system of (metaphysical) beliefs.” (2006, 8) As such, to truly understand the evaluative dimension of a prudential analysis, it is necessary to study the substantial values embedded in it, where those values are socially, culturally and historically dependent.

5. Modernity and the Evaluative Dimension of Prudential Analysis
The substantial values deployed in the evaluative dimension of a prudential analysis come from a rich cultural, social and historical context. And, to see how those substantial values become constitutive of people’s view of well-being, a study of the origin of these values has to be done. In this section, I will show how such a study can be done by looking at the study of the modern sources of the Good embarked by Charles Taylor (1989) in his Sources of the Self. 

In Sources of the Self, Taylor (1989) provided an interesting account of modern identity. The notion of ‘identity’ refers to the way in which people understand and interpret the self, in turns, this notion of identity underpins the substantial values for the people, because it provides an image of the proper (and ideal) way to be a person, that is – it states the defining characteristics of being a self. Taylor’s discussion is rich in details, and I will confine myself to the two strands of modern self identified by him. The first strand may be called the ‘disengaged self’, which was first expressed in its most complete form by Descartes. And, the second strand is called the ‘expressive self’, which had Rousseau and the Romantics as its origin. In what follows, I will explain the defining characteristics of these two strands of the self, and state what are the substantial values derived from them.

According to Taylor, the disengaged self is characterised by its disengagement stance, i.e. the separation of subject and object (of inquiry), its primacy of instrumental reason, and an accompanied procedural conception of reason. This strand of the modern self portrays its ideal as an autonomous, rational and moral agent, who is self-determining and self-responsible, and whose acts ought to be determined by reason and reason alone. The formulation of agency as such places human dignity at the centre of the disengaged self. And, in many ways, the expressive self can be seen as a reaction to the disengaged self. While the ideal of the disengaged self is driven by rationality alone, the expressive self rejects the disengaged self’s lone emphasis on reason and embraces a broader notion of nature as inner voice, which takes seriously one’s feeling as a guide to their ideals. The defining characteristics of the expressive self, as Taylor noted, is sufficiently captured by the Romanticism’s doctrines, i.e. the right of the individual, the power to creative imagination and the importance of feelings for a meaningful life. (Taylor 1989, 368) 

There are two different pictures of (ideal) human nature behind the two strands of modern self. Human nature in the disengaged self can be defined exhaustively by the subject’s rational nature alone, and hence “individual differences are only unimportant variations within the same basic human nature”. The picture is different in the expressive self, individuals are essentially different, and the differences “entail that each of us has an original path which we ought to tread; they lay the obligation on each of us to live up to our originality”. (Taylor 1989, 375) The defining characteristics of the two strands of modern self and the human nature behind, in turns, become the basis of the substantial values. Here, the ideal of the disengaged self draws support from the practices of rational enquiry, and the ideal of the expressive self draws its power from various forms of artistic imagination. Albeit the differences, the two strands of modern self place the person, i.e. the subject, at the most important position.  And, emerging from the two strands of modern self is two different sets of values. 

To start with, knowledge, especially practical knowledge and technical knowledge, is promoted by the disengaged self to be valuable to all humankind. It is believed that only through the acquisition of knowledge people can exert control over their surroundings. This concept of knowledge presumes a specific standard that is modelled on rational inquiries. Anything that fails to contribute to the development of practical or technical knowledge or to satisfy the criteria adopted in rational inquiries, e.g. clarity and distinctness, is considered to be inferior. This is so, because human progress is to be assessed by the degree of control over their surroundings. Autonomy is another value that has assumed fundamental position in the disengaged self. Here, an autonomous being is defined as a subject, whose assent of her own actions, as well as the rules for such actions, must be a result of her own rational reflection. In other words, to be an autonomous being, one has to be a rational being. Since it is the subject's rational nature that constitutes her autonomy, the subject is deemed to have determined her own course of actions, and, thus, is responsible for her choices and actions. From the outlook of the disengaged self, every subject must be a rational being. And, because of this, every subject are in essence the same, therefore, they ought to be treated equally and impartially. Moreover, rational decisions and actions from different subjects should be seen as analogously acceptable because they can be justified by the same standard. This gives rise to a sense of tolerance, because a person’s rational decisions and actions are legitimate whether they are liked by the others or not. In summary, knowledge, autonomy, equality, impartiality and tolerance are the key values promoted by the disengaged self. 

The importance of autonomy and equality is also shared by the expressive self. Underlying the ideal of the expressive self is the notion of authenticity, i.e. to be true to one self. To be authentic, the subject must be free from externalities and to be able to act on their own will. While the disengaged self defines the subject by universalised reason, the expressive self points to individuals' differences. In such outlook, individuality is not to be disregarded, but rather to be valued. In other words, every individual should be considered equal precisely because of their uniqueness. Authenticity, together with the respect for differences, lead to the valuing of diversity: the subjects ought to be respected by and recognised as who they really are. So, diversity ought to be preserved. For the expressive self, its ideal can only be attained through self-expression or self-articulation of the individual's unique inner nature; such disclosure is not be to guided by reason, but rather it is a creative endeavour. Creativity, therefore, is another key value of the expressive self. Although the creative endeavour is not to be guided by (instrumental) reason, it does not entail that such an endeavour is without any standard. As Taylor has pointed out, for the purpose of self-discovery, the creative endeavour has to be epiphanic, where "the locus of a manifestation which brings us into the presence of something which is otherwise inaccessible". (Taylor 1989, 419) In other words, to satisfy the standard of the expressive self, the creative effort should not only be representational, it ought to be revealing as well. The key values of the expressive self, therefore, are authenticity, autonomy, individuality, equality, diversity and creativity.

6. “Is Googling Making Us Stupid” as Prudential Analysis
Once we realise the substantial values in prudential analyses of IT are grounded in a culturally, socially and historically rich notion of identity, it is possible to recast the analyses in terms of those key values embedded in them. By doing so, it does not only clarify the normative basis of the evaluative claims in the appraisals, it also enables us to better understand those claims, thereby, allows us to fairly accept or dismiss them. In this section, I will provide an example of recasting an appraisal via the two strands of modern self discussed at above, I will focus on Nicholas Carr’s appraisals of the Internet’s impacts to the people’s reading and thinking habits.

The main claim made by Carr in his appraisal of the Internet can be summarised as the following: the Internet, in particular, the Web, with its information-thick and hyperlinks-rich environment, has transformed people’s reading habit. He argued that reading online, which jumps from one point to another, is a completely different activity from reading in the traditional sense. The result, he noted, is that a person can no longer concentrate on longer texts, which makes deep reading difficult. He believed that this is bad for people, because reading habit directly influences thinking habit, thus, when deep reading is no longer possible, so is deep thinking. Accompanied with this major claim, Carr also criticised the design of the Internet itself. He believed that its very vision of design predetermines the exclusion of deep reading (and deep thinking), as he summed up Google’s vision, i.e. “the more pieces of information we can “access” and the faster we can extract their gist, the more productive  we become as thinkers” (Carr 2008).

How are we going to evaluate the evaluative dimension of Carr’s appraisal? Particularly, how are we going to evaluate his claims that the Internet, because of its design, is bad for people, and also the claim that deep reading (and thinking) is essential to people? Here, Carr’s appraisal can be recast in terms of the key values embedded in the two strands of modern self outlined in previous section. The vision of the Internet’s design is, in effect, the disengaged self’s notion of knowledge. Knowledge, so conceived, is merely technical or practical, and its purpose is to enable human being to gain control. In other words, Carr’s negative appraisal of the Internet’s design is precisely an argument rooted in the discontent of such a notion of knowledge. And, if the disengaged self’s notion of knowledge is indeed insufficient, then Carr’s point should be rightly taken.

Similarly, the importance of deep reading (and deep thinking) can be grounded in the key values embedded in the expressive self. Recall the expressive self’s valuing of authenticity, individuality and creativity, these values are clearly noticeable in Carr’s praise of deep reading, as he wrote,
“The kind of deep reading… is valuable not just for the knowledge we acquire from the author’s words but for the intellectual vibrations those words set off within our own minds… for that matter, we make our own associations, draw our own inferences and analogies, foster our own ideas.” (Carr 2008)
What is so important about deep reading, accordingly, is that it allows a person to exercise her creativity to formulate her unique thoughts that belong only to her. Deep reading is, in this sense, necessarily epiphanic. In short, Carr’s appraisal of the Internet is one that assumes the perspective of the expressive self. By revealing the normative basis of Carr’s claims, e.g. the key values underlying ‘deep reading’ and ‘deep thinking’, we are in a better position to judge the plausibility of those claims. The claims, in other words, are based on a specific understanding and interpretation of the self. 

By revealing the underlying key values embedded in the appraisal and explicating the relation between the key values and the more substantial values the appraisal deploys, we have provided a firm ground for the normative claims in the appraisal at the same time. As such, recasting the appraisal via the two strands of modern self allows us to reformulate the arguments of the appraisal in full detail and utilise its insights in other contexts.

7. Conclusion: The Future Research on Prudential Analysis
In this paper, I have argued that appraisals of IT similar to Carr’s constitute a separate category of normative and evaluative analysis of IT. They are, as I called them, prudential analyses of IT. I have also pointed out, and then rejected, the reasons why they are neglected by researchers in ICE. Particularly, I argued that if a theory of well-being is to provide practical guidance to people with respect to the developments and/or uses of IT, it ought to consider the insights from prudential analyses, because those analyses provide contextually-rich information that can complement the abstract and theoretical nature of the philosophical theory of well-being. I then apply a framework I have drawn from Brey (2006) to analyse and evaluate Carr’s appraisal of the Internet as an example of how such an investigation can be done. I hope I have provided sufficient motivation for researchers in ICE to paying more attention to these prudential analyses.

Yet, by analysing and evaluating Carr’s as an example, I have only restricted myself to the values related to a person’s well-being. Ideally, it is possible to deploy the same framework to analyse and evaluate appraisals of IT that are about its impacts on a society as well. Since the key values, which form the normative basis of prudential analyses, are culturally, socially and historically based, to analyse and evaluate appraisals related to societal well-being (or, the good (or bad) for a society), it requires careful investigations of the origin of those values.

Moreover, I have also confined myself to an analysis that assumes a (Western) modern perspective. However, it should be obvious that appraisals of IT as such can be delivered by people from different perspectives, i.e. Confucian perspective, Buddhist perspective, Islamic perspective, etc. Therefore, to fully utilise the framework developed in this paper, it is necessary to go beyond the (Western) modern perspective and study the comprehensive doctrines in various cultures. In this way, prudential analyses of IT will enable us to see how IT affects the quality of life of people in different cultures. More importantly, by drawing insights from different cultural perspectives, it will undoubtedly enrich our theoretical and practical resources to answer the question: how should one live in an era of Information Technology. 
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Prudential analysis of Information Technology: is an analysis of the prudential values (or disvalues) of Information Technology, which is governed by the ideal of the Well-being.

Prudential value: refers to “everything that makes a life good simply for the person living it.”

Hedonism: is a family of theories that maintains that the greater the pleasure and the fewer the pain a person has, the better will be the person’s life.

Desire theory: is a family of theories which maintains that one’s well-being consists of the fulfilment of the person’s desire

Objective list theory: is a family of theories that maintains that one’s well-being is determined by a list of goods that may be independent to any individual’s acquisition of pleasure or fulfilment of desires.

Objective theories of well-being: state that there is a list of objective goods for people’s well-being regardless of whether a person approves it or not.

Subjective theories of well-being: state that a person’s well-being ought to be determined by the person herself.















^1	  The other notable examples include Andrew Keen (2007) and Mark Bauerlein (2008)
^2	  For a general survey of the current topics in Information and Computer Ethics, see Bynum (2008), Himma & Tavani (2008) and van den Hoven & Weckert (2008).
^3	  For an overview of psychological research on well-being, see Tiberius (2006).
^4	  In this paper, I do not have enough space to discuss the detail of various theories of well-being, but Crisp has provided an excellent survey on the topic in Crisp (2008). 
^5	  Feldman, in Chapter 3 of Feldman (2004), has provided an extensive analysis of various objections to hedonism.
